From the official description of my book at Cornell University Press:
In The War after the War, Johannes Kadura offers a fresh interpretation of American strategy in the wake of the cease-fire that began in Vietnam on January 28, 1973. The U.S. exit from Vietnam continues to be important in discussions of present-day U.S. foreign policy, so it is crucial that it be interpreted correctly. In challenging the prevailing version of the history of the events, Kadura provides interesting correctives to the different accounts, including the ones of the key actors themselves, President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger foremost among them. In so doing, Kadura aims to forge a synthesis between orthodox and revisionist interpretations of this important period.
Kadura finds that the strategy employed by Nixon and Kissinger centered on the concepts of “equilibrium strategy” and “insurance policy.” That approach allowed them to follow a twofold strategy of making a major effort to uphold South Vietnam while at the same time maintaining a fallback strategy of downplaying the overall significance of Vietnam. Whether they won or lost on their primary bet to secure South Vietnam, Nixon and Kissinger expected to come through the crisis in a viable strategic position.
And here are some reviews from leading experts on the Cold War and the Vietnam War:
“Johannes Kadura’s book is a welcome addition to the literature on the United States’ tortuous exit from Vietnam. Meticulously researched and engagingly written, it provides a fresh look at and perceptive analysis of the last stages of America’s longest war.”-Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, author of The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War
“In The War after the War, Johannes Kadura draws on excellent research at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and the Gerald Ford Presidential Library to fill in a gap in our knowledge of the policy and goals regarding the Paris Peace Agreement. In so doing, he forges a synthesis between orthodox and revisionist interpretations of the period between 1973 and 1976. Kadura’s argument that Nixon and Kissinger followed a twofold strategy is made all the more persuasive because he includes Cambodia and Laos in his analysis along with Vietnam. He notably provides a convincing explanation of how Kissinger, in particular, used the concept of a decent interval”-David F. Schmitz, Robert Allen Skotheim Chair of History at Whitman College, author of Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War
Johannes Kadura’s The War after the War: The Struggle for Credibility during America’s Exit from Vietnam, has been chosen as among the Choice “Outstanding Academic Titles” for 2016.